“Nation longs for one more day with dying manufacturing sector.” This headline, published in 2014 by the satirical website the Onion, anticipated both President Donald Trump’s fears and the retorts he gets from his critics. Mr Trump campaigned on a promise to bring back jobs in manufacturing after decades of decline. To those who see the future of the American economy in services, these promises seemed backward. When he was head of the National Economic Council, Gary Cohn reportedly asked the president which he would prefer: sitting in nice air-conditioned office, or standing on his feet all day.

　　“制造业生命垂危，国人依依不舍。”2014年，讽刺网站“洋葱网”发布了这样一个大标题，预言了总统特朗普的忧惧和批评人士对他的反驳。特朗普在竞选中承诺要挽回数十年间不断减少的制造业就业岗位。在那些认为服务业才是美国经济未来的人看来，这样的承诺是种倒退。据说加里.科恩(Gary Cohn)还在担任国家经济委员会(National Economic Council)主任的时候，曾问特朗普他是更喜欢坐在舒服的有空调的办公室里，还是站一整天。

　　In 2018 it looks as though the president is winning the day. Industrial output is on a tear, and the last few months have seen the best run for growth in manufacturing jobs since the late 1990s. After spending about two decades on a steady march downwards, manufacturing’s share of the labour market appears to have all but stopped falling. Between 1948 and 2008, manufacturing employment fell as a share of private non-farm employment by around 0.4 percentage points each year (see chart). Since January 2010 it has fallen by only 0.3 points in total.

　　到了2018年，看起来是特朗普最终占了上风。工业产出一路上扬，而且最近几个月制造业就业实现了自上世纪90年代末以来最强劲的增长。制造业在劳动力市场中的占比在经历了约20年的稳步下行后，基本已经停止下跌。1948年至2008年间，制造业就业人口占私营非农就业人口的比重每年约下降0.4个百分点(见图表)。而自2010年1月起，该比重总共只下降了0.3个百分点。

　　Put another way, the number of American manufacturing jobs has been rising almost in line with overall employment for the past eight years, defying both historical experience and expectations. In the recoveries from the recessions of the 1990s and the 2000s manufacturing never regained its share of the labour market. In 2017 the Bureau of Labour Statistics forecast that the number of manufacturing jobs would continue to fall at an average annual rate of 0.6% per year between 2016 and 2026.

　　换个说法，过去八年来，美国制造业就业数量差不多随总体就业率的提高而增长，这既不符合历史经验，又出乎人们的预料。在从上世纪90年代和新千年的两次经济衰退中恢复的过程中，制造业在劳动力市场中的占比从未恢复至原有水平。2017年劳工统计局(Bureau of Labour Statistics)预测，2016年到2026年间，制造业岗位数量将会继续以平均每年0.6%的速度减少。

　　What is going on? It is possible that the surprising strength of manufacturing employment is a temporary phenomenon, and that it will soon revert to its earlier, downward trend. Is it a prelude to an industrial revolution, in which humans will be replaced by a more programmable kind of factory worker?

　　这是怎么回事?制造业就业显现出令人意外的强劲态势有可能只是个暂时现象，也许很快就会回归之前的下行趋势。这种局面会不会是一场工业革命的序幕——人类将会被一种更容易编程的工厂工人取代?

　　Peter Schott of Yale University points out, however, that over the past 60 years the norm has been for the number of manufacturing jobs to recover fully after downturns. The early 2000s was an exception because of a large increase in goods imported from China. If recovery is normal, perhaps it is unsurprising that the current one has lasted so long, because the downturn in 2008 was so deep.

　　然而耶鲁大学的彼得.肖特(Peter Schott)指出，过去60多年来的常态一直都是经济衰退后制造业岗位会完全恢复至先前水平。本世纪初是个例外，原因在于进口自中国的商品大幅增加。如果说就业恢复是正常状况，那么眼下这一次持续了这么久可能也就不足为奇了，毕竟2008年的衰退是那么惨重。

　　Alternatively, the robustness of manufacturing jobs could reflect a more permanent shift. “It seems unlikely that the share of manufacturing employment will go to zero. Maybe we have hit the point where the share flattens off,” says Mr Schott. The trend is similar in both non-durable goods and durable goods industries, even though durable goods include things like cars, where sales tend to be more sensitive to the economic cycle.

　　或者，制造业就业强劲也许反映出一种更持久的变化。“制造业就业的占比似乎不太可能会降到零。或许我们已经下行到了最低点，这个比例会稳定下来。”肖特说。非耐用品和耐用品行业都出现了这样的趋势，尽管耐用品中还包含像汽车这样销售状况往往对经济周期更加敏感的产品。

　　Robert Lawrence of Harvard University argues that the shift away from manufacturing employment during the second half of the 20th century was mostly the result of gains in productivity, rather than competition from imports. More so than in other sectors, technological progress allowed fewer workers to make more stuff. Consumers did not respond to the resulting lower prices by buying very much more of that stuff, so employment fell.

　　哈佛大学的罗伯特.劳伦斯(Robert Lawrence)认为，20世纪后半叶就业人口从制造业流出主要是生产率提高的结果，而不是来自进口商品的竞争。由于科技进步，用更少的工人就能生产更多的产品，这一点在制造业尤为突出。而由此带来的价格下降并没有促使消费者大量购买产品，制造业就业率因而下降。

　　Since the recession, productivity growth in manufacturing relative to services has slowed. Mr Lawrence calls the associated jobs boom the exception that proves the rule. Overall, one can have growth in manufacturing productivity, or growth in manufacturing employment, but not both, he suggests.

　　自经济衰退以来，制造业生产率增速相对于服务业已经放缓。劳伦斯认为就业增加这个例外反证了生产率增速放缓的事实。他认为，一般来说，一国可以实现制造业生产率提高，或者制造业就业率提高，但不会两者兼得。

　　The lacklustre productivity growth could be a temporary feature of the economic cycle. An abundance of workers looking for jobs since the financial crisis has kept a lid on wage growth, perhaps blunting companies’ incentives to invest in labour-saving automation, thereby reducing productivity growth. According to numbers crunched by Nick Bunker of Indeed, a job-matching website, manufacturing is one of the few sectors where the number of unemployed workers continues to exceed the number of job openings.

　　生产率增长乏善可陈有可能是经济周期的一个暂时表现。金融危机后大量出现的求职者抑制了工资增长，可能削弱了企业投资于能节省劳动力的自动化技术的动力，进而降低了生产率增长。求职网站Indeed的尼克.邦克(Nick Bunker)分析数字后得出，制造业是为数不多的失业人口持续超过职位空缺的部门之一。

　　Mr Trump’s brand of import-blocking economic nationalism is supposed to encourage companies to bring production back to America. It is possible that his threats to rip up trade deals and impose tariffs are making risk-averse business executives keener to plant their factories at home. However, tariffs on imported steel and aluminium could be pushing them in the opposite direction, by raising input costs for American factories. The same goes for tariffs on imported Chinese parts.

　　特朗普那套企图将进口产品阻挡在外的经济民族主义被认为可以促使企业将生产迁回美国。在特朗普撕毁贸易协定、加征关税的威胁下，那些追求规避风险的企业高管可能更有意愿回归美国建厂。然而，对进口钢铝加征关税也许会造成美国工厂投入成本上升，进而将它们推向相反的方向。对进口自中国的零部件加征关税也会有同样的影响。

　　In any case, the manufacturing renaissance Mr Trump is presiding over does not mark a return to those bygone days when America was great. Historically, the sector was seen as a gateway into the middle classes for Americans with only a high-school education. But over time the composition of employment has shifted towards managerial and professional roles, and away from production jobs that can be done by those with less schooling. Manufacturing workers today are also less likely to be unionised than they once were, so they have fewer benefits.

　　总之，特朗普治下出现的制造业复兴并不标志着美国就此回到了它堪称伟大的旧日时光。从历史上看，制造业是那些只有高中学历的美国人通往中产阶级的途径。但随着时间的推移，就业人口已向管理和专业领域转移，并从无需太高教育水平就能胜任的生产岗位上转走。制造业工人如今加入工会的可能性也不比从前，因而获得的福利也更少了。

　　The type of work being done is changing, too. The rise since 2011 in manufacturing employment has been concentrated production of food and transport equipment, which includes carmaking. Meanwhile, printing, computer-making and the production of clothes each account for a smaller share of manufacturing jobs than they did seven years ago.

　　人们从事的工作种类也在发生变化。2011年后增加的制造业就业人口主要集中在食品生产和包括汽车制造在内的运输设备生产领域。与此同时，印刷、计算机制造和服装生产如今在制造业就业中的占比较七年前均有下降。

　　Where did we go right?

　　谁沾了特朗普的光?

　　Jobs are also moving geographically. Since the recovery started, the East North Central region, which includes places like Michigan and Illinois, has captured a share of employment gains that exceeds its share of job losses during the recession. Meanwhile the Middle Atlantic region, which includes New York and Pennsylvania, has seen no net increase in manufacturing employment at all since 2011.

　　工作岗位在地理层面也发生了转移。自制造业开始复苏起，密歇根州和伊利诺伊州所在的中部东北区在岗位增长中贡献的份额已经超过了该地区在经济衰退期间岗位流失所占份额。而纽约州和宾夕法尼亚州所在的中大西洋地区自2011年起未录得任何制造业就业人口净增长。

　　In politics, however, not all places are created equal. Calculations by The Economist suggest that the counties that voted for Mr Trump in November 2016 have experienced larger manufacturing job gains since 2011. They have also tended to see the largest gains since the election. In these places, manufacturing’s share of overall employment has risen relative to the rest of the country. Far from dying off, manufacturing in America appears to be humming the president’s tune.

　　然而，在政治上，不是所有地方都“生而平等”。经本刊估算，那些在2016年11月投票给特朗普的县自2011年以来在制造业岗位上的增幅更大。它们在大选后的增幅往往也是最大的。相较于美国其他地区，这些地方的制造业在总体就业中的占比上升。看起来，美国制造业远远还未闭眼，倒是哼起了特朗普的调门呢。